The Pro-Life Movement On The Left

Most Americans who are pro-life don't experience it from the left side of the political spectrum. Without a doubt, it is terribly difficult to be pro-life on the political left. The current political landscape in America presents a dire problem for "pro-life progressives," even more so if they're Catholic and observe the Church's teachings. Pro-life progressivism is a growing, still voiceless, movement in the Democratic Party. There is a sense of alienation from pro-choice Democrats in regard to "women's issues" (abortion) and "life-saving scientific research" (embryonic stem cell research) as well a sense of being out of place amongst conservative Republicans whom we might agree with on a few issues, but disagree with on a host of others and perhaps fundamentally on political philosophy. This movement (I think) is really reflective of many American youth, who not only oppose abortion and euthanasia, but would like to see "life issues" extend to the 30,000 children who die globally each day from poverty and preventable disease, issues of genocide in places like Darfur, human trafficking, healthcare, foreign policy issues of war and peace, and even to environmental stewardship. Many Catholic Democrats see this as what the late Joseph Cardinal Bernardin coined as the "consistent life ethic."

While I personally hold this view, I think there are two fundamental tendencies of this approach to politics ("the consistent life ethic") that presents a profound challenge, particularly to Catholics. The first is the prevailing tendency to make all political issues morally equal, i.e. fighting abortion is morally equal to providing universal healthcare. This is a tragic intellectual mistake. In the current election season this sort of thinking hasn't gone unnoticed with the wave of pro-life Americans voting for Sen. Barack Obama despite his radical abortion stance because "there are other issues." Indeed, I'm not one to deny that there are other issues that I care deeply about, but not even a monolithic committment to all these other issues in a "pro-life" way can draw attention away from the insurmountable horror of Barack Obama's hyper-liberal abortion agenda.

The second tendency of this group (this is just modern "progressivism" in general) actually causes the first. This tendency is toward moral relativism; the absence of an objective standard of good and evil easily allows for a pro-life individual to see reforming the American healthcare system as "more pressing" than stopping the genocide of 1.2 million unborn children every year. And the tendency toward this kind of thinking is more deep-seated than we like to realize. The American political tradition (and therefore the thinking of American citizens) is deeply rooted in legal positivism, which as a philosophy sees a disconnect between law and morality. This theory fundamentally presupposes moral relativism because allegedly the only way to maintain order in a secular society is not to affirm moral truths, which in itself establishes a false sense of peace, which begins to dissipate into what Princeton law professor Robert P. George calls the "clash of orthodoxies," i.e. secular humanist-moral relativists vs. Judeo-Christian moral conservatives.

It's safe to say then the fundamental problem is our moral thinking. Consider what C.S. Lewis coined as the "abolition of man." If God created us and endowed us with our human nature, then we can be assured that our nature is in harmony with His good purposes. Given that we have a nature, certain things go against it, won't fulfill us, and this is what we Christians call sin. But what if we could alter our nature? We live in a society where we create life in laboratories, can alter genetics, and implant embryos. This invokes to my mind a looming possibility of Huxley's Brave New World. The fundamental question is: is this in accord with our nature? Are humans meant to be created in this way? Whether or not a person believes in God will profoundly shape their conclusion to this question. There is no natural law without God and the fundamental notion that follows the absence of God is that our humanity is not a creation and therefore, there is no reason why we should not create embryos in laboratories for medical research nor for mothers who want a baby as if it were a consumer product.

How is this relevant to "pro-life progressives?" This group sees why abortion is a repugnant evil, which is wonderful. This movement may be key in ending the horror of abortion in America if they are successful in reversing the Democratic Platform and align themselves with pro-life conservatives. However, the mordern notion of "progress" may inevitably be their (and everyone else's) downfall.

In a recent political debate with a friend of mine, who like me, is a pro-life Democrat, except I'm Catholic, the fundamental difference is just as I described. He is voting for Obama and I'm voting for McCain. My friend sees it this way: American healthcare reform, namely universal healthcare is a "pro-life" issue, McCain won't do anything about abortion, and healthcare will help reduce the abortion rate. Perhaps he's right. But what about the fact that Barack Obama said that his worse choice in his senatorial career was his vote to save Terry Schiavo (he doesn't oppose euthanasia) and his expression at the "Compassion Forum" that he thinks people should have the choice to end their lives and their suffering if they choose to (physician-assisted suicide)? Or what of his remarks about funding abortion through his healthcare plan undermining the Hyde Amendment?

It doesn't matter. For my friend, healthcare reform is a pivotal issue that we cannot miss this time around. "Love your neighbor," he cited as his reasoning for voting Obama. But modern, hyper-liberal, pro-sexual revolution thinking doesn't really include God. The notion of the natural law is godless (because we have to include the atheists) because we cannot affirm the existence of God and without God, we cannot recognize our neighbors, whom we're supposed to love, for what they are. To be a person, according to the natural law, is to be a proper subject of absolute regard—a "neighbor"—it is persons whom I must not kill, must not steal from, etc. What is a person? A person is a creature made in the image and likeness of God.

The problem with losing sight of God is this: we don't lose sight of killing our neighbor as wrong, more than we don't recognize our neighbor when we see them (e.g. the unborn). In contemporary secular ethics, the ruling tendency is to concede that there are such things as persons, but to define them in terms of their functions or capacities—not by what they are, the image of God, but by what they can do. Therefore "personhood" is defined in terms of consciousness, reasoning, self–motivated activity, the capacity to communicate about indefinitely many topics, and conceptual self–awareness. If you can do all those things, you're a person; if you can't, you're not. The functional approach to personhood seems plausible at first, just because—at a certain stage of development, and barring misfortune—most persons do have these functions. But to think that they are their functions blows the core right out of the moral code.

This is often used as a justification for abortion. The slogan of pro-choicers is heard loud and clear: "every child a wanted child." But, by this logic, an unwanted child is not a child…so kill it? Obviously, unborn babies are not capable of reasoning, complex communication, and so on. If they cannot perform these functions, then by definition they aren't persons, and if they aren't persons, they have no inherent right to life. The real question is a philosophical one and it's undoubtedly moral. One might say, "surely a collection of tiny cells don't constitute personhood in such a way that trumps a woman's right to personal autonomy."

That's the mindset. But it cannot end with abortion. If unborn babies may be killed because they lack these functions, then a great many other individuals may also be killed for the same reasons—for example the asleep, unconscious, demented, addicted, infants, toddlers, someone in a coma on life-support (euthanasia), not to mention sundry other cases, such as deaf–mutes who have not been taught sign language. In such language, none of these are persons; in theological language, this is clear denial of the human person coming from God.

The cure for such blindness is not to tinker with the list of functions by which we define persons, but to stop confusing what persons are with what they can typically do. Functional definitions are appropriate for things which have no inherent nature, things whose identity is dependent on our own purposes and interests.

If I am a person then I am by nature a rights–bearer, by nature a proper subject of absolute regard—not because of what I can do, but because of what I am. Of course this presupposes that I have a nature, a "what–I–am," which is distinct from my present condition or stage of development, distinct from my abilities in that condition or stage of development, and distinct from how this condition, stage of development, or set of abilities might happen to be valued by other people. In short, a person is by nature someone whom it is wrong to view merely as a means. If you regard me as a person only because I am able to exercise certain capacities that interest you, then you are saying that I am not a person. And so the functional definition of personhood does not even rise to the dignity of being mistaken, it is just irrational and incoherent. With each different criterion of personhood, a different set of beings is welcomed through the gates of others' regard. This is the same rule of all oppression. Those who supported slavery were free and those who support abortion are born. Personhood is defined at our convenience.

It is clear then that moral principles are more important than policies. Moral principles gives us the capacity to priortize our political agendas accordingly and with a sense of how policies should be shaped, i.e. why abortion is a paramount issue. Much more can be said of this, but given the broad set of political issues, the pro-life movement (this is especially true of Catholics) has constantly faced a fundamental question often heatedly debated that I'm not at liberty to answer authoratatively. I have my convictions about if or when a pro-life Catholic could ever (if possible) vote for a pro-choice candidate, but I believe people of good will may disagree with me and I place no judgment on them. Honest disagreement can only lead to a healthy debate.

But we cannot avoid the question that often divides us: Can someone who is pro-life and Catholic vote for candidates who are not only pro-choice, but who promote policies such as universal healthcare that is accompanied by an unquestionably flawed approach to bioethics, which inevitably creates more problems? That is, can we argue "proportionate reasons" when the principles of one side is based on a terribly flawed view of the human person and society? It is striking to me that many pro-life Americans, even Catholics, go to great lengths to defend or qualify a pro-choice candidate's position, or even worse make them out to be more "pro-life" than the person who opposes abortion (Doug Kmiec).

I understand their argument and in all truthfulness, I don't disagree with them entirely, but I do think it gets so casual that one may vote consistently for pro-choice candidates without discerning the issue of abortion. Moreover, I don't think any of these same people would vote for a racist candidate no matter what that candidate said or how good, say, their economic plans are. No one would vote for Hitler because he supported universal healthcare (he did; Germany was the first nation in the world to have it) despite the fact he supported the genocide of 6 million Jews as well as nearly 6 million others who died along side them. Genocide would disqualify him from receiving our votes, period.

Yet when a candidate supports the systematic, public funded genocide of 1.2 million unborn children in America as well as subsidizing abortions overseas (e.g. not giving foreign aid unless they provided abortion facilities as was done under the Clinton administration) and below the border in Mexico, contributing to the over 45 million abortions that occur within 365 days worldwide, there are suddenly "other issues." Sometimes it is argued that overturning Roe v. Wade will not do anything, so we should leave abortion legal. Should we have left slavery legal and only sought to reduce the number of slaves? Such argument is incoherent. It's even argued that social programs will lead to less abortions. I think this is true to an extent, but on some level we (all) should agree that citing evidence from Europe is not convincing because Europeans are contracepting themselves to death and don't have nearly as many children to be carried by the safety net of social programs, hence, less abortions.

I won't objectively say a pro-life American, Catholic or otherwise, cannot (ever) vote for pro-choice candidates. Should they? That's another question and I think good Catholics may come down on both sides. Pro-life progressives, particularly Catholics ones, need to stop accomodating pro-choice candidates. Why should the Democratic Party feel any need to change its position on abortion, if they realize they will receive our uncritical support anyway, even while we disagree?

The Dictatorship of Relativism and "The Abolition of Man"

The Catholic Church holds that "deep within his conscience man discovers a law which he has not laid upon himself but which he must obey. Its voice, ever calling him to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, sounds in his heart at the right moment...For man has in his heart a law inscribed by God...His conscience is man's most secret core and his sanctuary. There he is alone with God whose voice echoes in his depths." (CCC 1776).

The psychological phenomenon that we have coined, conscience, is not merely a personal feeling or opinion. But it is God attempting to speak to us through our brokenness—through the limits of our humanity—and our conscience in action is our last best judgment at the good or evil of an action based upon our intellectual, religious, and experiential understanding of human nature (i.e. the natural law—the law of human nature.)

This view is vehemently challenged by modernity. We ask ourselves: do moral absolutes exist? Are there behaviors, mindsets, or bits of speech which may be called morally right or wrong—for all people, regardless of how anyone might feel? If not, what would it mean for there not to be any objective standards of right and wrong? What is significant should be given to the fact that many people do not live up to their understanding of right and wrong? These are all pertinent questions.

Moral Relativism

It is a common conviction—based on observation—that moral codes differ in every society. But mistakenly, the conclusion is drawn that morality is merely a social construct of acceptable behavior and habits, and thereby, is fundamentally relative. Certainly there is disagreement among nations and even individual people on what is right and wrong. But mere disagreement does not imply that there is no answer—objective, external, and independent on anyone's personal convictions. If a person is to say, "all religions are equally true," this would yield to reason as nonsensical. By this logic, Muhammad is and is not the last great prophet of God. The immediate contradiction would prove the assertion false.

One might say that there are certain moral rules that all societies will have in common because these fundamental rules are necessary for society exist to defend the initial proposal of relativism. Yes, while that may be true, what is common is not coincidence, but perhaps the universal realization amongst nations of certain moral truths that are fundamental and simultaneously necessary for an operating society, e.g. don't steal, don't murder, etc.

The presumption that there are no facts and no one is right when morality is concerned is severely flawed. It is simple (and more rational) to say, "He has his opinion, and others have their opinions" and that might just be the end of it. But it is another thing to say: morals are based upon feelings and nothing more. If morality is entirely subjective, that is, relative to the person, then discriminating against a person for any specific reason whether it be race, sexual orientation, gender, appearance, height, weight, eye color, or identifying characteristic is not morally wrong—not wrong it any universal sense that would be obligatory for the person to change their behavior or binding on anyone else to also protest. It may, in fact, upset your personal moral taste, but you will just have to accept the moral tastes of others, which is, by the acceptance of moral relativism, just as right as your moral position.

Even more, there is a fundamental self-contradiction to the idea of moral relativism. To say that "all morality is relative" is a self-defeating claim. First, since morality is entirely relative to the person, anyone holding such a position is only saying, "It is my opinion…that all morality is relative." This is not true at all, but rather an opinion and opinions don't hold water in philosophical arguments of discerning whether or not something is true.

But what is more problematic is that the claim "all morality is relative" is a universal claim about the very nature of morality itself. It is a determination of the nature of morality for everyone, in all places, and at all times: it is relative. The fundamental idea of relativism is that there are no absolutes, but the very proposition of relativism: 'there are no absolutes' is an absolute claim and this renders moral relativism an inherent contradiction.

It is such thinking of morality being determined by the person and not any standard that leads to statements, such as, "while abortion might not be right for me, it could be the right choice for someone else." Essentially, every individual determines what is morally right for him or her. But disagreement, again, fails to demonstrate that there are no moral absolutes. If two men were to disagree over whether there is life on Mars or not does not make it logical to say, "while there may be life on Mars for you, there isn't life on Mars for me." It's absurd. There either is or isn't life on Mars.

Consider this curious phenomenon: human beings at all times and in all place have had this curious idea that they should behave in a certain way and they cannot get rid of this notion. If you were to witness two people arguing over the good or evil of some action, they silently recognize an unspoken standard. Even if one of them violated this unspoken standard, there is an excuse, a reason, that in their circumstance, under certain conditions, it was acceptable to violate said standard—the standard is never denied.

But even in recognition of this standard of ideal behavior that humans imagine, we do not behave consistently with it. We know the natural law; yet we break it. Where does this natural law derive? Perhaps, moral truths just exist. Moral truths could only be a psychological projection of a certain standard that we perceive to be ideal based on our realization of the flaws in our social contracts. I think this insight is not wholly untrue—it may be how we began to think about our moral failures—but this it would not make the morals truths necessarily true at all, but rather morally relative because the projection would vary person to person. Then again, moral awareness just may be a biological adaptation that is necessary for the survival of our species. But this too would not imply moral truths.

Why else might there be moral truths? Perhaps we are the creation of a moral Creator, thus, the universe is the purposeful work of a righteous God and our moral awareness, rooted in our human nature, is a result of the character and purpose of the God who made us in His image. But this is too far a leap for our agnostic, post-modern world.

Ironically enough, it is arguable that there aren't substantial differences in each culture's values. Murder, for example, has been wrong in every culture at every time in history. The only thing that changes is the concept of justification. Hitler justified killing Jews because Jews were said to be subhuman and not fit for the beautiful new world order that he envisioned. Murdering of human beings remained wrong. The same can be said of people who favor choice in regard to abortion. They do believe that human life is valuable, but they do not believe unborn babies are "persons" that have human rights. In the same way, supporters of embryonic stem-cell research ask the question, do six tiny cells with human DNA qualify as a "person" with human rights? Hence, in many cases, apparent moral discrepancies between cultures only reflect a difference in perception of the same facts pertaining to a particular circumstance not an outright conflict in the values themselves. We live in a world of competing philosophical frameworks that dictate our moral convictions. The presence or absence of God from these frameworks makes a critical difference.

Read this well-written, articulate "First Things" article by J. Budziszewski entitled "The Second Tablet Project" that eloquently illuminates what a metaphysically unfounded moral theory really means and the effects of removing God from morality.

A Clash of Orthodoxies

I read the article A Clash of Orthodoxies and wrote a paper analyzing its rhetoric in a course on philosophical ethics. The fundamental problem is the global tendency toward moral relativism. In the end, this approach leaves all of mankind in a false sense of peace.

I highly recommend the article. Robert P. George is an intelligent man. His points are clear and his moral vision is consistent with his view of the human person, a view that is shaded by all human disciplines.

Read the article.